

NSC BRIEFING

19 January 1955

CURRENT SOVIET AIMS

- I. Soviet diplomacy, ~~propaganda energetically aimed at--~~:
  - A. Frightening West out of German rearmament;
  - B. Impressing entire non-Communist world with strength, "peaceful" attitude of USSR.
- II. ~~On rearmament issue~~, USSR searching for dramatic ways prevent ratification Paris accords, or at least raise Western doubts wisdom actually carrying out German rearmament.
  - A. <sup>Earlier</sup> First, pressure on France, Benelux, <sup>to treat canceller</sup> Britain, climaxed by 13 Jan notes to WEU countries.
    1. Warned that accords would provide West Germany with ABC weapons in defiance Geneva convention:

~~SECRET~~

Approved For Release 2000/08/30 : CIA-RDP80R01443R000300210013-3

a. Thus intensify danger of sort  
war specially threatening to  
"Eur countries with great  
density population."

B. Next (15 Jan), efforts woo West  
Germans with--

1. Offer of diplomatic relations;
2. Hint (with weasel escapes) of  
Soviet okay for supervised  
all-German elections.
3. Both offers contingent on German  
rejection Paris accords. Also  
declared direct contact with  
Moscow only road to reunification.

C. In addition such overt gestures, prob-  
able that USSR covertly responsible for  
rash of recent "war imminence" rumors.

1. Example--6 Jan Dutch labor leader's  
claim that "battle signal" had been  
given, USSR start preventive war

rather than see West Germany rearmed

Approved For Release 2000/08/30 : CIA-RDP80R01443R000300210013-3

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

D. In contrast such covert "scares" USSR has actually--

1. Avoided committing itself to military counter-action in event German rearmament.
2. Has cut down "war" propaganda within Bloc, presumably because of ~~POPULAR FEAR~~ bad reaction--including some "panic-buying."

*Det*

*Machet*

E. Actual concrete Soviet moves--as distinct from propaganda--confined to harassment in Berlin, Austria.

1. Berlin--definite increase in checks on border-crossers.
2. Austria--setting up check-points around Vienna, and thinly veiled threats to "partition" country.

*gesture to West leaders*

III. As ~~token of "peaceful" intentions~~, USSR made two "dramatic" atomic energy announcements in last few days.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

A. Stated (14 Jan) that atomic power

station data will be given to UN  
science conference in August.

B. Announced (17 Jan) that both ~~supplies~~

fissionable <sup>ES/</sup> and atomic "know-how"

would be given five Orbit states

(China, East Germany, Czechoslovakia,

Rumania, Poland--which now supplying

USSR with atomic raw materials).

1. Five will get research equipment

(e.g.-cyclotrons), assistance in

building small experimental

reactors, and fissionables

required for power.

2. Can thus join Big Brother in

"peaceful" development atomic

power.

C. Actions belatedly counter US "atom

pool" plan, clear way for rival Soviet

plan on <sup>orbit</sup> international scale--including

Communist China.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

D. Also soothe Satellite discontent over Soviet exploitation nuclear resources without return benefits.

E. USSR already considering extending atomic offer to additional nations-- probably including underdeveloped Asian countries where USSR now stressing offers of economic and technical assistance, One key target--India.

F. Moscow can now back up such offers with atomic goods.

IV. These flexings Soviet diplomatic muscles give special meaning to report

25X1C8b

25X1C8b

25X1C8b

[REDACTED] that Soviet Northern Fleet "units" will travel 5,000 miles through Atlantic and Mediterranean in Feb for combined maneuvers with Black Sea Fleet. (Northern Fleet's major units--4 ~~light~~ cruisers, 29 destroyers, 47 submarines).

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Approved For Release 2000/08/30 : CIA-RDP80R01443R000300210013-3

- A. If major movement, would be unprecedented in history Soviet Navy.
- B. Such voyage would be mainly political "showing flag."
- C. Although voyage would offer US intelligence opportunities, also presents real intelligence challenge.
  - 1. Taking ships away from exposed northern coast and bottling them up in Black Sea would be persuasive indication USSR not expecting immediate war.
  - 2. US would get valuable insight Soviet naval tactics, logistic support, air cover (if any), etc.
- D. Challenge to US intelligence would be need to reckon with precedent of Soviet forces (naval and possibly air) suddenly appearing in open Atlantic on demonstrably "peaceful" missions.

Approved For Release 2000/08/30 : CIA-RDP80R01443R000300210013-3

~~SECRET~~

1. Future might see frequent entries  
Soviet forces in international  
waters and airspace.
2. Might provide cover for Soviet  
reconnaissance and even "spoof" air  
feelers aimed at US radar.

25X1B4f

